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The process of national welfare reform has been overtaken by local reform as states implement
experimental programs under federal waivers. Most of these initiatives attempt to enforce work or
otherwise control the lives of the dependent in return for support. Research, which traditionally stressed
the social and economic aspects of welfare or poverty, must be reoriented to address the administrative
issues raised by the emerging paternalism. A combination of field interviewing and analyses of
reporting data can track implementation and connect program operations to outcomes. Such research
assesses program performance less surely than experimental trials do but is more useful to operators




Below, I first describe the policy context for welfare that has emerged in the last decade from
both federal and local initiatives. “Welfare” here primarily means Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC), the principal federal-state family assistance program. I then contrast the usual
assumptions made about welfare and its reform in the earlier era with those that prevail now. An
emphasis on economics and entitlement has ceded to efforts to control the lifestyle of the adult
recipients. I then argue that the approaches researchers take to welfare must also change if they are to
address the issues raised by this paternalistic style of reform. Research must focus more on
administration, less on the economics of welfare. One resource could be research based on
administrative data. I illustrate with the case of Wisconsin. Today’s welfare reform is an exercise not in
economic transfers, but in state building.
THE POLICY CONTEXT
Welfare became a critical national issue due to the rapid growth in welfare dependency in the
1960s. The AFDC rolls grew from around 5 million to over 11 million people between the late 1960s
and the early 1970s, a period remembered as the welfare boom. The causes included higher benefit
levels set by states (which qualified more families for aid), Supreme Court decisions that eliminated
some regulatory barriers to aid (such as residency requirements), and above all a greater willingness by
those eligible for aid to claim it, due to a decline in welfare stigma.
In response, most states stopped raising benefits as fast as inflation, causing grants to decline in
real terms. The fall was offset by increases in Food Stamps and other in-kind benefits, but the value of
AFDC and Food Stamps together in the median state still fell 27 percent between 1972 and 1993. Yet2
despite lower benefits, between 1989 and 1993 the rolls surged again, from 11 to over 14 million
persons (U.S. House of Representatives 1994, pp. 374, 395). This time the main causes apparently were
a recessionary economy and rising rates of unwed pregnancy (Congressional Budget Office 1993).
National Welfare Reform
The politics of welfare are complicated, and this has prevented government from addressing the
welfare problem with large changes in the scale of assistance. One might take growing dependency as a
sign of undeserved economic distress and seek to expand aid as an antipoverty device. But liberal
proposals to do this in the 1960s and 1970s were defeated because voters and politicians would not
accept greater dependency by working-aged adults, and on cost grounds. One might also cut benefits
radically or abolish aid in order to force dependent adults to show more self-reliance, but the public has
also opposed this out of concern that needy children would be harmed.
Instead, Congress has tried to reform welfare from within by removing its perceived “abuses.”
From the 1970s, it required states, who run AFDC using federal and state funds, to purge ineligibles
from the rolls and reduce grant overpayments (“quality control”), and collect more child support from
the fathers of welfare families. Above all, it tried to move more welfare adults into jobs through
employment programs linked to AFDC. The latest of these is the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills
Training Program (JOBS), set up under the Family Support Act (FSA) of 1988, the last federal welfare
legislation.
Recent proposals in Washington continue this tradition of national, mostly work-oriented
reform. The Clinton administration proposed in 1994 to require all employable adults to work after two
years on the rolls. The Republican Congress proposed in 1995 to require half of all welfare adults to
work by 2002, limit families to five years on the rolls, and block-grant welfare to the states so that
federal funding would no longer be open-ended. At this writing, Clinton and Congress have not agreed
on a bill, and there may be no further federal reform until after the 1996 election.3
The States Reform
That has not stopped change, however, because a parallel track of reform has broken out at the
local level, as Michael Wiseman emphasizes (forthcoming). Going back to the 1970s, some states
obtained waivers of normal federal rules to try out welfare reforms of their own. Their authority to do
this was expanded by Congress in 1981, and since then presidents have granted waivers liberally. Since
the early 1990s, these state proposals have become more numerous and ambitious. Today, further
national reform may be stymied, but two-thirds of the states already have waivers to run experimental
programs of some kind using AFDC funds (Noble 1996).
Joseph Califano famously remarked that welfare reform is “the Middle East of domestic
politics” (Califano 1981, p. 321). The subject arouses such passions on all sides that fundamental
change can seem impossible. For several reasons, change is currently easier in state than in national
politics. States face more fiscal pressure to reduce dependency than does Washington, because
constitutionally they have to balance their budgets as the federal government does not. They also may
feel more accountable for welfare and thus more exposed to public upset at the growing rolls than
federal officeholders. Governors see the political rewards of reforming welfare, and under current law
they already have more control of the program than Washington does. Thus, a Tommy Thompson in
Wisconsin or a John Engler in Michigan can make a record against welfare as presidents cannot.
Wisconsin’s AFDC rolls have fallen by a third since Thompson became governor in 1987, and this has
probably given him more influence on national welfare policy than anyone else.4
THE OLD WELFARE AND THE NEW
Taken together, the Family Support Act and local reforms shifted the assumptions behind
welfare. Until the debates in the mid-1980s that led to FSA, most experts and many policymakers
viewed welfare in terms of economics and entitlement. The main purpose of AFDC was income
maintenance, to tide one-parent families over their loss of a breadwinner. Welfare was an entitlement in
the budgetary sense that benefits were assured to all eligibles. It was also an entitlement in the
behavioral sense that welfare adults generally did not have to do anything to get aid except establish
and maintain their income eligibility. The goal of welfare administration was mainly to pay out grants
accurately.
Welfare reform was largely Washington-led, with most proposals for change stemming from
the White House. While quality control and child support reforms were restrictive, other changes were
client-oriented. Although reformers aspired to reduce the welfare rolls, they approached that goal
mostly by improving the chances recipients had to work, so that more would take jobs. Their tools were
again economic—changes in benefits and incentives. In the 1960s and 1970s, clients who went to work
were allowed to keep more of their grants, to create “work incentives,” and welfare work programs
were supposed to train recipients for higher-paying positions, so that they would be more likely to leave
welfare. Some liberal reform plans proposed to create government jobs for people who could not find
regular employment, a feature also of the recent Clinton plan.
Toward Paternalism
Since FSA and the local reforms, however, welfare has become more paternalist. The goal is
not only to support families in need but also to change behaviors by some recipients—especially unwed
pregnancy, nonwork, and nonattendance at school—that seem to perpetuate dependency. And whereas
the old welfare assumed entitlement, the new rests on an idea of “social contract” or reciprocity: Adult5
recipients are now to be required to work or satisfy other requirements, in addition to financial
eligibility rules, in order to get aid. The paternalist trend reflects rising public impatience with welfare,
but also a policy history where benefits or training provided to the dependent on a voluntary basis did
little to cause more recipients to work (Mead 1986, 1992).
Reform has become more society-oriented. The goal of reducing the caseload is now
paramount, with economic gains for the recipients secondary. Reformers seek not only to reduce
dependency, but also to send a message to the society that parents are to be held responsible for
supporting their families. The style of reform is also less economic. To be sure, conservative reformers
at both the national and local level aim to save money, and some states have reduced benefits and
eligibility for aid. But severe cuts have so far been imposed only on general assistance, a local program
that serves mainly single men, who have the weakest claim to aid. GA also draws no federal funds and
thus is largely outside the national welfare debate.
In family welfare, which supports children, curbing access to aid would affront the public
desire to protect children, so benefit cuts have so far been small. Most AFDC reform plans seek not to
forbid aid, but to use it to change the behavior of welfare parents. Some states have increased work
incentives. Some now reward welfare parents financially for marrying (Wisconsin’s “Bridefare”) or
penalize them for having additional children while on welfare (New Jersey’s “family cap”).
Unfortunately, research and experience suggest that incentives or services that leave the desired actions
optional have little influence on the behavior of most recipients. The work incentives provided in
federal law in the 1960s and 1970s did not raise work levels on welfare (Moffitt 1992b, pp. 15–19,
40–42), and voluntary training programs and government jobs do not raise earnings enough to take
many people off the welfare rolls (Bassi and Ashenfelter 1986).6
The Vogue for Enforcement
Accordingly, most of the recent reform programs rely on administrative suasions rather than
benefits or incentives. Rather than reward a client incrementally for the desired behavior, they make it a
precondition for obtaining aid. This trend toward enforcement goes back to the 1980s, when most of the
experimental programs implemented by states involved tougher work requirements than were then
permitted under federal law. Most of these programs mandated participation. Some of the experiments
received better evaluations (mostly by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation [MDRC])
than earlier training efforts, and most of the results showed positive impacts on clients’ earnings,
employment, and dependency (Gueron and Pauly 1991).
In finished MDRC evaluations of AFDC work programs to date, the average gain in earnings
was 16 percent and the average cut in dependency was 6 percent, relative to the control group. Those
effects are still limited, but they are in general stronger than those recorded by voluntary programs. The
main reason probably is that mandatory programs are able to reach a more disadvantaged clientele, one
that would not participate on its own. The chance to improve outcomes relative to a control group is
thus larger than it would be with the more employable (Friedlander 1988).
The programs’ effects on behavior, furthermore, far exceed their economic impacts. The
projects evaluated by MDRC typically doubled the share of clients who were active in some work or
training activity compared to controls. The vast majority of clients either had to participate in some
way, go to work, leave welfare, or accept a sanction (a lower grant) for failing to participate (Mead,
forthcoming). This satisfied the public will to hold welfare adults accountable, which is stronger than
the will simply to get them off welfare (Mead 1992, pp. 57–63).
Alongside the social contract rationale, MDRC’s results were a major force behind the Family
Support Act, whose main purpose was to expand welfare employment programs (Wiseman 1991; Mead
1992, chap. 9). FSA did not require that the new JOBS program be mandatory, but it set higher7
participation standards than previously, and most states could not meet these without enforcing
participation. By 1995, states were required to have 20 percent of their employable recipients active in
JOBS on a monthly basis, a level that sounds low but was much higher than earlier. The recent Clinton
and Republican reform plans would both raise that participation rate to 50 percent, although the GOP
defines a much larger pool of eligibles than Clinton.
The main theme of the recent waiver programs is an attempt to extend behavioral requirements
into new areas, rather than to make economic changes such as benefit cuts or incentives. Of the thirty-
five states that currently have waivers, seventeen have curbed benefits with time limits or family caps,
but fourteen require welfare mothers to cooperate in finding the father for child support purposes and
twenty have instituted “learnfare,” a mandate that mothers stay in school or keep their children in
school on pain of a grant reduction. Another popular demand is that mothers immunize their children
against disease. The waiver requests now pending assure that the vast majority of states will soon be
trying to manage the lives of recipients in some way (Preston 1996; Besharov and Gardiner 1996, pp.
82–83).
Such attempts are not new. Welfare is centuries old, as are controversies about whether the
recipients are “deserving.” Government typically prefers to regiment clients’ behavior rather than
address the social deficiencies, such as unemployment or low wages, that help to keep people needy
(Katz 1986). But the new paternalism really is novel in two ways. First, it is much more visible
politically. Past efforts at social control occurred largely prior to the 1960s welfare boom or in the
South, where caseworkers on their own authority often demanded that single mothers stop consorting
with men as a condition of aid. Today, welfare is a major issue in national and state politics, and reform
occurs through highly visible executive proposals and legislative enactments. Second, the new
paternalism has an analytic basis that earlier social control lacked. Positive evaluations have made
enforcement of work, if not other behaviors, into a proven device. 8
The following discussion relies largely on Mead 1994.
*
Typical compendiums of research along these lines include Jencks and Peterson (1991) and
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Danziger, Sandefur, and Weinberg (1994).
REORIENTING RESEARCH
The rise of paternalistic welfare raises different issues from those welfare experts and analysts
have typically studied. Academic research on welfare or poverty focuses chiefly on economic and
social conditions, not the administrative strategies states are now counting on to reduce dependency.
*
Current Research
In the main, existing research is descriptive rather than policy-oriented. Studies document the
features of various poor or welfare-dependent populations, usually using quantitative databases such as
the Current Population Survey (CPS), the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), or the National
Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY). Researchers detail, for example, the demographics, family
background, or earnings of welfare mothers, low-skilled men, or school dropouts. They find that these
groups are more disadvantaged—more nonwhite, less educated—than the mainstream population. They
trace these conditions in turn to disadvantaged parents or an earlier life of unwed pregnancy, school
failure, or crime. Welfare mothers, for example, are more likely to have grown up on welfare and have
children young and out of wedlock than are single mothers who avoid welfare.
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But to catalog disadvantage has few policy implications. It does not establish whether or how
change is possible. One may infer from the deprivations that the poor or dependent could use higher
income or better health or child care. But benefits received are usually the only aspect of social
programs that academic research discusses. That is partly because benefits are usually the only thing
that the databases record about program participation. They usually do not record the administrative9
suasions that recipients may be under, such as child support orders or work tests, although a few studies
add such indicators to academic databases (as, for example, in Plotnick 1990).
The evaluation literature, such as the MDRC studies, shows programmatic effects, but again,
policy implications are unclear. These studies contrast outcomes, such as earnings, for clients given a
tested program with outcomes for a control group. Random assignment between the two groups
obviates selection effects, or unmeasured differences among clients, and thus makes the difference in
results a valid estimate of program impact. But this same methodology usually prevents saying much
about how the impact was produced. The programs tested are typically complex, with some clients
assigned to one activity and some another. Yet the experiment cannot compare the subtreatments for
results except in the few cases where clients were randomly assigned among those options. Without
randomization, selection effects rather than the alternative treatments might cause the different results.
So the trials usually test only the program as a whole, which remains a “black box.” One cannot tell
what feature of it produced the impact—was it enforced participation, job search, generous support
services, or what?
Also, each experiment is discrete. Each permits a valid impact estimate at that site, because
randomization and a common labor market take out of the picture nonprogram factors that might affect
results. But across sites, social and economic differences are unavoidable, and one cannot tell what role
they played in the different success of the programs tested. As a result, comparisons across sites are
judgmental at best. MDRC is highly cautious about saying whether or how one local program is
“better” than another, even within the same evaluation (Riccio, Friedlander, and Freedman 1994, chap.
8).
The need for rigorous evaluations also recedes the more of them are done. Although
evaluations are difficult to collate, results to date make fairly clear that mandatory welfare work
programs generally outperform voluntary ones, and that programs that stress work in available jobs10
Tightly run, work-oriented Riverside outperformed most other counties in MDRC’s evaluation
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of California’s GAIN program, and in its national JOBS evaluation, programs emphasizing immediate
employment have outperformed those stressing education or training for “better” jobs, at least in early
results. See Riccio, Friedlander, and Freedman (1994) and Freedman and Friedlander (1995). For the
argument that remediation may have long-term benefits, see Friedlander and Burtless (1995).
outperform those that stress preparing clients for better-paying jobs before going to work.  In
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Washington, both the Clinton and Republican reform plans mandated participation, and both cut back
training in preference to immediate work. Most recent state-level proposals do the same.
Administrative Questions
Far more urgent now are the issues raised by the paternalism attempted by local welfare
reforms. One question is implementation in the grossest sense. Is it possible to control the lives of
recipients in return for aid, as most of the current reform programs promise?
Many governors today announce welfare reform plans. To do this reaps immediate political
rewards, yet few states manage to reduce their rolls by much. Little research exists on the local
implementation of reform, but clearly not all proposals are approved by legislatures or obtain waivers,
and few are implemented so as to change how welfare runs at the operating level. In New Jersey, for
example, Governor Christine Todd Whitman recently proposed to limit families to five years on the
rolls and move more recipients into jobs, as against long-term training (Preston 1996). But in 1987, the
state enacted a previous reform that was supposed to mandate participation and serve the whole
caseload. The bureaucracy resisted the participation requirement, counties proved uncontrollable from
the center, funding was inadequate, and little was achieved (Nathan 1993, pp. 4–6, 46–49, 55, 61–67).
Similar political and bureaucratic obstacles exist in other states (Norris and Thompson 1995). The
Wisconsin experience, where reforms were approved and executed and the rolls fell, is unusual (Mead
1995, 1996).11
The best-known research on reform implementation is process-oriented. The MDRC studies
document the flow of clients through programs. They establish that it is possible to implement work
programs so as to reach the bulk of the adult caseload, although at best a majority of them will
participate actively at any given time (Gueron and Pauly 1991, pp. 128–40). Other studies describe the
local politics of reform or the choices states made about services and funding to implement JOBS or
other programs (Hagen and Lurie 1994; Norris and Thompson 1995). However, this work and the
MDRC process analyses make no connection between program operations and performance. In the
MDRC case, the reason again is the methodological inability to connect subprocesses to impacts.
Without a bottom line, it is unclear what difference implementation makes.
Even if reforms can be implemented, what is the best way to do so? The answer might come
from more sophisticated experimental studies where there is randomization across the ways clients are
assigned so that the effects of these can be measured. MDRC is currently performing an evaluation in
which competing versions of JOBS are being compared experimentally in three locations (Freedman
and Friedlander 1995). It is possible to imagine a very sophisticated experiment in which several
variations of a program were tested at several sites while the impact of the entire program was also
estimated (Greenberg, Meyer, and Wiseman 1993).
But the logistical problems would be prohibitive. Not only do local program operators resist
randomized trials, which force them not to serve all eligibles, but the governors now launching reform
programs have made little provision for serious evaluation. In theory, Washington insists that the new
programs provide for evaluation before it grants waivers, but the research designs accepted are often
compromised. Few of the initiatives launched by Tommy Thompson in Wisconsin have received a
definitive assessment (Pawasarat and Quinn 1993). Even if the states cooperated, many of the new
programs are too complex to be easily evaluated. Even if an impact were shown, one would not know
which facet of the new policy produced it (Wiseman 1993).12
Projects to do this are underway at the University of California at Berkeley and the University
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of Wisconsin at Madison. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services recently commissioned
a study of state data (Marcotte 1994), and the subject was intensively discussed at a conference on
monitoring the new federalism held by the National Center for Children in Poverty and the Institute for
Research on Poverty in Washington, D.C., on February 26, 1996.
ADMINISTRATIVE RESEARCH
The nature of the issues and the constraints on experimentation point toward the use of
administrative data as a basis for studying the new programs. The databases used to administer welfare
grants and JOBS programs are improving in sophistication. Many now cover both the financial and
employment aspects of a case, some permit tracking clients over time, and some can provide a fair
number of control variables, albeit fewer than in academic databases. There is currently much interest
in developing state administrative data as a basis for research, particularly if federal data sources are
reduced due to funding cuts.
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Interviews and Reporting
The best way to use such data is not to analyze it separate from government operations, as
academic databases are used. Rather, use it in conjunction with field research. Interview welfare or
work program staff about how they run JOBS or some experimental program, then check this against
reporting data on how clients are actually assigned. Interviews provide essential information about the
meaning and interpretation of the data, while the reporting in turn is a check on the inevitable
subjectivity of interviews.
In a recent study of JOBS in Wisconsin, for example, personnel in Kenosha and Sheboygan
counties told me they had a much tougher, work-oriented program than did similar officials in Dane,
Fond du Lac, Milwaukee, and Racine counties. Kenosha and Sheboygan said they enforced
participation stringently and required clients to work or look for work before going into education or13
training. The other four counties seemed more lenient about nonparticipation, and they favored training
clients for “better” jobs rather than requiring them to take low-wage positions immediately.
I then verified these impressions using reporting data. Table 1 shows the percentage of welfare
recipients mandatory for JOBS who were in various statuses in the program in these counties and
statewide in a typical month in 1993.
As the interviews suggested, Kenosha and Sheboygan did enforce participation (enrolled)
higher proportions of their clients than did the other four counties. They also had much higher
percentages in job search and working in regular or unpaid jobs. They were, however, also higher than
the other four counties in percentages in education and training, in part because their higher enrollments
gave them more people to assign (Mead 1995, pp. 18–22).
In 1994 and 1995, according to state officials, statewide policies required all counties to move
toward the tightly run, work-first approach of Kenosha and Sheboygan. The impact of these measures
again shows up in the reporting. Between October 1993 and two years later, the share of JOBS clients
who were inactive or in education or training statewide dropped from the figures above, while the
shares in job search and work rose. The proportions who were enrolled and from disadvantaged groups,
however, fell, a sign that, facing pressure to make job placements, JOBS may be starting to “cream,” or
serve the more employable (Mead 1996, pp. 18–22).
Structural Models
One can also use administrative reporting to help explain measures of program outcomes,
controlling as well as possible for nonprogram influences such as the demographics of clients or the
labor market. Typically, the units of analysis are local offices or other subunits of the same program.
Outcome measures include the shares of clients getting jobs, working while on welfare, or leaving
welfare, plus the quality of their jobs (retention rate, job entry wage).TABLE 1
Percentage of Clients in Administrative Statuses in JOBS, October 1993
In Inactive In In In In In
Enrolled Statuses Sanctioned Job Search Regular Jobs Unpaid Jobs Remedial Education Postsec. Education
Kenosha 88 24 1 8 37 3 11 12
Sheboygan 90 11 1 8 35 5 32 11
Dane 76 34 4 2 16 1 6 8
Fond du Lac 84 33 1 1 24 3 13 9
Milwaukee 86 32 8 4 19 1 4 5
Racine 78 16 8 3 18 0 8 15
Statewide  86 30 5 4 22 1 7 9
Source: Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services.15
Several other studies like this exist; a bibliography is available on request. Two examples using
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the Work Incentive Program, the predecessor of JOBS, include Mitchell, Chadwin, and Nightingale
(1980) and Mead (1988).
Time-series models cannot validly explain a dependent term, such as raw caseload levels, that
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may change without “stationarity.” See Chinn (1991).
Michael Wiseman’s conclusion (forthcoming) is similar, although I see less evidence that a
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fall in benefit levels has contributed to the Wisconsin fall.
Table 2 shows one such model estimated for the 72 Wisconsin county JOBS programs in 1993.
The dependent term is the percentage of JOBS clients who entered jobs expected to last 30 days in that
year. The possible explainers included several features of the caseload and the local labor market.
Besides an intercept, only the indicated terms were significant at .10 or better.
Results show that the proportions of clients enrolled in JOBS and assigned to job-readiness
activities (motivation and job-search coaching) had strong positive effects on the proportions entering
jobs, even controlling for the nonprogram environment. The share of the caseload black was the only
demographic term to matter, and the growth in employment was the only labor market term (why it is
negative is unclear). Similar models for the shares of clients working while on welfare or leaving
welfare also showed that the more clients were obligated to participate and to work, the better a county
performed. Models for job retention rates and wages were much weaker. In these instances the
demographics of the caseload and its education or training mattered more, although administrative
terms still showed some influence (Mead 1995, pp. 27–33).
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One can build similar models to explain not program performance, but the change in the
welfare caseload over time. Modeling across different jurisdictions may be a more valid way to explain
caseload change than time-series models.  In Wisconsin, the welfare rolls fell more during the years
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1986–94 in counties that enforced work and child support well, controlling for several other
demographic and labor market differences. These analyses suggest that Wisconsin’s unusual welfare
fall is due to both successful reform programs and a favorable economy (Mead 1996).
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TABLE 2
Regression Model of Percentage of JOBS Clients Entering JOBS, Wisconsin Counties, 1993
Coefficient S.E. Signif.
Percentage of clients enrolled in JOBS .274 .096 .006
Percentage of clients in job readiness activities .296 .062 .000
Percentage of clients black -.361 .102 .001
Percentage growth in employment -.382 .204 .066
Population density .004 .002 .053
Proportion of variation explained (R ) .54
2
Source: Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services.
Note: Precise variable definitions are available on request.17
Such results suggest that the potential of JOBS to influence welfare is real. Whether welfare
recipients go to work is not dictated by the environment, as the descriptive literature on welfare and
poverty tends to suggest. It also depends on whether the adults are expected to work. Equally important,
structural modeling like this addresses the “how.” It breaks into the black box of the program as
experimental evaluations seldom can. It shows the payoffs to treating clients one way versus another.
Administrative findings reveal the levers that produce results, and they show operators what works best
in their context. Such models also permit more rigorous comparisons across local programs than is
possible with discrete experimental evaluations. They show which localities perform well or poorly
relative to their environment, and something about why.
ADMINISTRATIVE RESEARCH VERSUS EVALUATION
Of course, this method neutralizes nonprogram influences using statistical controls, in place of
the experimental control used in randomized evaluations. That opens the door to selection bias. One
cannot be sure that the effect that a particular assignment appears to have is not partly due to
unmeasured features of the clients put in that assignment, particularly when the available control terms
are limited. It is reassuring, however, that the main implications of structural modeling run parallel to
those of the evaluation literature: mandatory, work-focused programs are best. Another problem is
identification—establishing that the apparent link between assignment and outcome is causal and in the
direction assumed. A safeguard here is field research. Interviews help to establish causal connections
and directions. Operators tell you what they think produces results in a program, and this furnishes
hypotheses to be verified with the statistical analyses.
Despite these limitations, administrative research can fill a middle in the existing literature. It
does not describe the poor or welfare dependent as thoroughly as studies based on academic databases,
nor does it provide as sure a measure of program results as the evaluation literature. But it makes a18
One study of welfare cuts based partly on a survey is Danziger and Kossoudji (1994–95), but it
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applies to general assistance rather than AFDC.
firmer connection between policy and outcomes than either of them. Once evaluations have made clear
what successful welfare reform programs look like, further evaluations contribute little to policy
knowledge. The research agenda should shift to implementation.
A major reason social programs show small effects is incomplete implementation. When
implementation is thorough, it will probably be clear that some reform programs do have effects, at
least on behavior. Wisconsin not only enforces work on the rolls but diverts many people who are
eligible away from welfare by persuading them to take jobs or rely on their families (Mead 1996, pp.
13–18, 38–41). Probably any state that executes such policies as fully will drive many of its employable
cases off the rolls, as Wisconsin has done.
In these cases the leading evaluation question is no longer whether a program has any effects on
its clients but rather the effects on the larger society. Welfare employment programs may reduce
welfare as much or more by deterring entry to the rolls as they do by promoting exit (Moffitt 1996).
Such systemic effects fall largely outside welfare or work programs, so they cannot be studied with
program-centered evaluations. Experiments cannot reveal what happens to people diverted from
welfare by work policies, or who never apply because of them. Other methods such as surveys or the




Administrative assessment also fits the actual goals of the current reforms better than
conventional evaluation. Most localities are trying to control client lifestyle, not just to raise
employment or reduce dependency, but as an end in itself. The public wants to see welfare parents
working and their children in school even if there are no economic improvements—even if enforcing19
these behaviors costs more than just paying out aid (Mead 1992, pp. 57–63). Like law enforcement or
public schools, welfare reform is justified by social values where the concern is more to shape behavior
than raise incomes or save money. Implementation, therefore, is a better measure of success than
monetary gains for the clients or the government budget.
The caseload decline in Wisconsin has saved millions of dollars. But the state has also invested
much of the savings in the support services needed to put recipients to work, especially child care. Even
more, it has invested in the bureaucracy, spending millions on the case managers and computerized
reporting systems needed to oversee the caseload. The result has been less a cut in welfare than a
transformation of the welfare system. Welfare is changing from a subsidy into a regime (Mead 1996,
pp. 48–53). The gains are chiefly in the civility of welfare, and are not measurable in dollars and cents.
The emerging paternalism is justified by antigovernment rhetoric, but its real agenda is state
building. State and local administrators are striving to get control of their caseloads. They are building a
welfare state that is able to govern as well as support people. Policy research can help determine the
best way to do that. The frontiers of welfare research, like welfare policy, are institutional.2021
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